We derive a simple equation to calculate the global welfare impact of the simultaneous reduction of trade costs between multiple country-pairs. Interestingly, we …nd that we obtain the same equation for a broad class of trade models. Moreover, balanced trade is mostly not required for the equation to work, nor does trade elasticity need to be known. The global welfare impact only depends on two sets of statistics: (i) the ratio of bilateral trade ‡ow between each pair of trading partners and global income; and (ii) the percentage change in exporting cost for each pair of trading partners. The class of models includes the many-country, many-good neo-classical-type model, and the Armington-type models such as Eaton and Kortum (2002) , Krugman (1980 ), Melitz (2003 with Pareto distribution of …rm productivity, and the extensions of these models to the multi-country and multi-sector case, multi-factor production technology, multi-stage production, the existence of intermediate good and the existence of a non-traded good sector in each country. We then apply the equation to estimate the global welfare impact of the worldwide reduction of international shipping costs in the last …ve decades.
Introduction
One major theme of international trade economics is the gains from trade. There is a presumption in all trade models that the more integrated is the world, the higher are the gains from trade. show that a country's gains from trade conditional on the import penetration ratio and the trade elasticity are the same regardless of what model is used as long as they belong to the same class of trade models (which we call Armington-type models, following Rodriguez-Clare), which include Armington (1969) , Krugman (1980) , Melitz (2003) with Pareto distribution of …rm productivity, and Eaton and Kortum (2002) , among others. Speci…cally, a country's gains from trade are always given by the same formula and is determined by only two su¢ cient statistics: (i) the share of expenditure on domestic goods, which is equal to one minus the import penetration ratio; and (ii) the elasticity of imports with respect to the variable trade cost. This is no doubt a signi…cant discovery. It helps us to better understand the properties of these Armington-type models. However, there are some limitations to their equation. First, it no longer holds when trade is unbalanced.
Second, it no longer holds when extended to multi-sector setting. 1 Third, the estimated trade elasticity may be sensitive to the trade model used. For example, Simonovska and Waugh (2012) …nd that trade models that incorporate micro-level margins lead to lower measured trade elasticities and hence larger gains from trade, relative to models without these margins. Consequently, the gains from trade predicted from ACR's formula di¤er from model to model, e.g. the gains from trade calculated based on the Armington model are less than those based on Eaton-Kortum (2002), while those based on Krugman (1980) are less than those based on Melitz (2003) .
Besides evaluating the gains from trade (or from reduction of trade costs) for an individual country, we often are interested in estimating the gains from reduction of trade costs for the world as a whole. Can we come up with a simple user-friendly formula to calculate the global welfare impact of the simultaneous reduction of trade costs for multiple pairs of trading partners? How sensitive is the answer to the assumption of the trade model? For example, does the existence 1 See, for example, Balistreri, Hillberry and Rutherford (2011).
of intermediate goods or o¤shoring matter? We …nd a striking answer to these questions. We …nd that, for a very broad class of models and settings, the percentage change in global welfare resulting from the simultaneous reduction of trade costs for multiple country-pairs is given by the same simple formula. There is no need for trade to be balanced in any country in most cases.
Speci…cally, we …nd that the percentage change in global welfare is simply given by the sales-shareweighted average of percentage changes in exporting costs for all pairs of trading partners, namely, given by the expression P n j=1 P n i=1 X ij Y w b ij , where X ij is the value of exports from country i to country j, Y w is the total GDP of the world, and b ij d ij ij is the percentage change in the cost of exporting from i to j. Hence, the global welfare impact only depends on two sets of statistics:
(i) the ratio of the bilateral trade ‡ow between each pair of trading partners and global income; and (ii) the percentage change in exporting cost between each pair of trading partners. In fact, the expression is just equal to the total saving in trade costs keeping trade ‡ows unchanged, divided by global income.
Note that the global gains from trade costs reduction solely arises from the "direct e¤ect"of the saving in trade costs which would otherwise have been wasted. The "indirect e¤ects" such as the changes in relative prices between countries, in trade balances, in the number of potential entrants, and in the extensive margins of trade in the countries, totally o¤set each other. In other words, the general equilibrium adjustments of these variables have no e¤ect on overall global welfare. Under both perfect and imperfect competition, the equation is independent of changes in relative prices because of the conservation of physical quantities of goods and it is independent of changes in trade imbalances because they sum to zero. Under imperfect competition, (i) it is independent of the number of potential entrants (i.e. entries and exits of …rms) because of the proportionality between total pro…t and total revenue in each country (based on our assumption A1); (ii) it is independent of the adjustments of extensive margins of trade because of the CES import demand system (based on our assumption A2). Therefore, in the end only the direct e¤ect remains. Most interestingly, the formula applies to a very broad class of models and settings, which include the many-country, manygood neo-classical-type model, and the Armington-type models such as Eaton and Kortum (2002) , Krugman (1980) , Melitz (2003) with Pareto distribution of …rm productivity, and the extensions of these models to the multi-sector case, multi-factor production technology, multi-stage production, the existence of tradable intermediate goods (as in Alvarez and Lucas, 2007) and the existence of a non-traded good sector in each country. Our work is inspired by that of ACR. Yet, our result not only applies to a considerably broader set of models and settings than theirs but also does not require the estimation of trade elasticity nor require trade to be balanced. We apply our equation to estimate the global welfare impact of the worldwide reduction of international shipping time in the last …ve decades, and the estimate is in the range [2:98%; 8:81%].
There are a couple of reasons why our equation applies more broadly than does ACR's. 2 There 2 ACR's equation can be adapted to evaluate the welfare impact of changes in trade costs on an individual country.
are e¤ects that a¤ect the welfare of individual countries that do not a¤ect the welfare of the world as a whole, as trade costs are reduced. There are two important e¤ects of this kind. First, the changes in trade balances sum to zero for the world as a whole but the change in trade balance for an individual country can be non-zero. This explains why our equation can allow for trade imbalances whereas ACR cannot. Second, in the multi-sectoral setting, the number of potential entrants in each sector changes because of the intersectoral resource allocation e¤ect. The welfare impact of the potential entrants e¤ects on country i originating from di¤erent sectors of the same country i do not o¤set each other. However, the global welfare impact of the potential entrants e¤ects originating from di¤erent sectors of the same country i o¤set each other. This explains why our equation applies to multi-sectoral setting whereas ACR's does not.
One may argue that the class of models to which our equation applies is not broad enough, given the restrictive nature of the models that it includes. However, if one accepts that the case of perfect competition is an important benchmark for analyzing the global macroeconomy, then our equation is not so restrictive. Under perfect competition, the restrictive assumptions (called A1and A2) that we need for the equation to work for the imperfect competition models are not required. Therefore, our equation is indeed quite general once one accepts perfect competition as an important benchmark for analyzing the global macroeconomy. In fact, one can cite numerous important papers analyzing the macroeconomy that assume perfect competition as the market structure. In our opinion, the reason for analyzing the imperfect competition models is to understand how much deviation from perfect competition we can allow for our equation to work. We …nd that when restrictions A1 and A2 (which are R2 and R3 in ACR) are imposed on the imperfect competition models, they behave in similar ways as the perfect competition model. It turns out that most of the trade models that are widely used in recent years satisfy these restrictions. Perhaps it is not coincident that these imperfect competition models have been widely used, as they are simpler and more user-friendly, which in turn is because they are closer to perfect competition. By imposing restrictions A1 and A2, we con…ne the models to be su¢ ciently close to perfect competition so that they become the cousins of the perfect competition model.
In fact, one can say similar things about ACR. Their equation applies to the perfect competition model with relative few restrictions. It only needs balanced trade (R1) and CES import demand (R3). However, under monopolistic competition, they need R2 as well so as to con…ne the model to behave like the perfect competition model.
One class of models that this paper does not include is the imperfect competition models with endogenously variable markups. Such models can capture the pro-competitive gains from trade which models with constant markups cannot. However, there is mixed empirical evidence on the size of the pro-competitive gains from trade. Indeed, pro-competitive e¤ects are sometimes negative so that variable markups reduce the gains from trade (see, for example, Arkolakis, Costinot, Donaldson and Rodriguez-Clare, 2012). In fact, Edmond, Midrigan and Xu (2012) conclude that the size of the gains from trade depends a great deal on the underlying micro-details. Therefore, there is no presumption that our equation will bias the estimate upward or downward by not including this class of model.
The message that the details of …rms'responses are of secondary importance to the estimation of the welfare impact of trade costs reduction for an individual country is explained in Atkeson and Burstein (2010) . Under the symmetry, i.e. the relative wage is one, they …nd that though changes in trade costs can have a substantial impact on heterogeneous …rms' exit, export, and process innovation decisions, the impact of these changes on a country's welfare largely o¤set each other.
In other words, the welfare impact of trade cost reduction calculated from the trade models based on monopolistic competition, such as Melitz (2003) with Pareto distribution of …rm productivity, mainly stems from the direct e¤ect of the reduction in trade costs. As Atkeson and Burstein (2010) analyze the welfare of an individual country, the mechanism in their model is closer in spirit to ACR's (which can be adapted to calculate the welfare e¤ect of changes in trade costs of an individual country) than to ours.
The structure of this paper is as follow. In section 2, we give a de…nition to the concept of the percentage change in global welfare and derive, based on the neo-classical assumptions, a simple equation to calculate this change as a consequence of the reduction of trade costs. It will be seen that the e¤ects of changes in relative prices of goods between countries o¤set each other from the global welfare point of view. In section 3, we switch our attention to the Armington-type models, and lay down the basic setup and assumptions. In section 4, under assumptions A1 and A2, we prove that the change in global welfare is given by the same equation as derived under the neoclassical type model. In section 5, we prove that the above equation continues to hold in a number of extensions of the basic Armington-type models, e.g. multi-sector, multi-factor, multiple stages of production, the existence of intermediate good, and existence of a non-traded good sector. Section 6 summarizes the results in the previous sections. Section 7 presents an empirical application of the model. The last section concludes.
A …rst cut at the problem
Suppose in the world economy there are n countries that are capable of producing m goods, which are all tradable. In this section, we …rst present a justi…cation for the use of an equation that we shall use as a measure of percentage change in global welfare. Then we derive a formula based on a neo-classical model with perfect competition to calculate the change in global welfare resulting from reduction of trade costs.
De…nition of percentage change in global welfare
We want to de…ne a measure of percentage change in global welfare resulting from small changes (in…nitesimal ones in the formal analysis) in trade costs. We would like to have a concept of change of global welfare such that an increase in global welfare signi…es an enlargement of the global pie so that potentially every country can be better o¤ by some proper income transfers between countries.
Note that income is transferable but utility is not transferable. Therefore, the sum of utility of all countries is not a good measure of global welfare based on this concept.
As the world consists of a number of sovereign countries, each of which only cares about its own welfare, we have to de…ne the improvement in global welfare based on the concept of Pareto improvement. More speci…cally, the improvement to global welfare resulting from a shock (such as reduction of trade costs) should be measured by how much potential Pareto improvement is a¤orded to the world after the change. Thus, we de…ne the percentage increase in global welfare (after trade costs reduction) as the maximum potential equiproportional increase in welfare of all countries after some proper lump sum transfers of income between countries. It measures the potential amount of Pareto improvement to the countries of the world as a whole. Note that this amount can be negative. The above concept of the change in global welfare is consistent with that of Kaldor and Hicks (see, for example, Friedman 1998). 3 Consistent with Kaldor-Hicks'concept of e¢ ciency, an outcome is more e¢ cient if those that are made better o¤ could in principle compensate those that are made worse o¤, so that a Pareto improving outcome can potentially result. This concept of Pareto improvement does not require compensation actually be paid, but merely that the possibility for compensation exists. De…ne E i , P i and U i as the expenditure, exact price index and welfare of country i, respectively. The utility function (or welfare function) of country i, given by U i (q i ) (where q i = q 1 i ; q 2 i ; :::; q m i is the vector of quantities of goods consumed) is assumed to be homogeneous of degree one in q i .
Consequently, we can de…ne an exact price index P i , which stands for the cost a consumer has to pay to obtain one unit of utility. Therefore, the total utility of all consumers in country i (i.e. welfare of country i) is given by U i = E i =P i for all i. After the reduction of trade costs, the vector of pricecum-welfare of the countries changes from (P 1 ; :::; P n ; U 1 ; :::; U n ) to (P 1 + dP 1 ; :::; P n + dP n ; U 1 + dU 1 ; :::; U n + dU n ). Let be the potential equiproportional increase in welfare of all countries after trade costs reduction. Then,
The LHS is the total expenditure before lump-sum transfers while the RHS is the total global expenditure after lump-sum transfers that leads to an equiproportional increase in welfare for all 3 Because we are considering small changes, the use of the Kaldor-Hicks compensation criterion does not carry with it some of the shortcomings cited by its critics.
countries equal to . Re-arranging the above equation, we have
where O 2 denotes second order terms, which can be dropped, as we are considering only in…n- consumed by each country before and after the shock. 5 This expression for the percentage change in global welfare has been used in the literature, such as in Hsieh and Ossa (2011) . However, as far as we are aware, we are the …rst to present a justi…cation for its use. 6 
A neo-classical-type model
Consider a many-country, many-good, many-factor trade model under perfect competition, and allow for the possibility of incomplete specialization in each sector in each country. 7 For lack of a better name, we shall call it a neo-classical-type model. It includes the multi-country, multi-good, 4 The third line follows from the second line as all second order terms are dropped when we only consider small dPi and dUi. See the appendix for a more detailed proof. 5 This is because we assume that the utility function of each country is homogeneous of degree one in quantities of all goods consumed in that country. Therefore, the percentage change in global welfare is homogeneous of degree one in the percentage change of quantities of all goods consumed in the world as a whole. 6 Note also that though our formal analysis is based on in…nitesimal changes, the equation should be a su¢ ciently good approximation as long as all percentage changes of Pi and Ui are less than, say, ten percent as a rule of thumb.
Therefore, the equation should applicable to many yearly changes. 7 We would like to thank Gene Grossman for suggesting a two-country two-good version of this model to us.
Ricardian and multi-factor factor-proportions models. Suppose in the world economy there are n countries that are capable of producing m goods, which are all tradable. Let ij = f1; :::; mg denote the set of goods exported from country i to country j. Therefore, the price p j (!) faced by consumers of good ! in country j satis…es
where ij is an iceberg trade cost such that ij units are shipped from the source country i for one unit to arrive at the destination country j (assume that ii = 1). 8 are assumed to be …xed) denotes the total sales revenue of …rms in country j, which is also equal to total output Y j , or the GDP of country j. The net export of country j is equal to
The question is: what are the e¤ects of ij on U k for i; j; k 2 f1; :::; ng? The answer to this question will guide us to calculate P n i=1 s i b U i resulting from changes in ij for i; j 2 f1; :::; ng.
Assumptions:
1. There is perfect competition in all goods markets.
2. Utility U j [q j (1) ; :::; q j (m)] is homogeneous of degree one in fq j (1) ; :::; q j (m)g and satis…es the usual assumptions of a well-behaved utility function.
3. De…ne y j (!) as the total output of good ! in country j. The production function y j (!) =
, which is the vector of factors employed in the production of good ! in country j, and it satis…es the usual assumptions of a well-behaved production function.
4. The extensive margins of trade are …xed, which means that the set ij 8 i; j remain the same before and after the change in trade costs.
Steps in deriving
2. p i (!) a¤ects R i . By envelope theorem, we have
, which is the total production of good ! in country i.
3. p j (!) a¤ects E j . By envelope theorem, we have @E j @p j (!) = q j (!), which is the total consumption of good ! in country j.
4.
Conservation of physical quantities of goods. Note that y i (!) = P n i=1 y ij (!) where y ij (!) denotes the quantity of good ! produced in i that is exported to country j. Thus, y ij (!) > 0 if i is an exporter of good ! to j and y ij (!) = 0 if i is not an exporter of good ! to j. Consequently,
Note also that q j (!) = P n i=1 q ij (!) where q ij (!) denotes the quantity of good ! consumed in j that is imported from country i. Thus, q ij (!) > 0 if i is an exporter of good ! to j and q ij (!) = 0
Therefore, if i exports good ! to j (i.e. ! 2 ij ), then y ij (!) > 0 and q ij (!) > 0. Moreover, the quantity of ! shipped out of i to j has to be equal to the quantity of ! shipped into j from i plus the wastage due to shipping. That is,
The LHS represents the total value of j's import of good ! from i, while the RHS represents the total value of i's export of good ! to j.
5. U j and p j (!) a¤ect E j , as shown in (1), which in turn is related to dX net j and the e¤ect of
by envelope theorem (steps 2 and 3)
6. Consider the expenditure function E j [p j (1) ; :::; p j (m) ; U j ] and the indirect utility function 
Substituting this into (5), we get
Combining this equation with (4), we have the expenditure-weighted percentage in welfare of country j given by
The …rst term re ‡ects the increase in welfare of j resulting from increases in F.O.B. prices of j the exporter, while the second term is the decrease in welfare of j resulting from increases in F.O.B.
prices of j the importer, keeping the trade costs unchanged. The sum of the …rst and the second term can be positive or negative. It re ‡ects the "relative price e¤ects" of the reduction of trade costs. The third term is the direct gains from saving in trade costs, which we call "direct price e¤ect". The last term re ‡ects the increase in welfare of j as expenditure increases relative to income.
Summing E j b U j over j, we have the expenditure-weighted average percentage change in welfare given by:
where the operator
. The second line follows from P n i=1 dX net i = 0, which is implied from P n i=1 X net i = 0; the third line stems from interchanging i and j in the …rst term on the previous line; the fourth line follows from equation (3); the last line stems from the de…nition of the total value of exports from country i to country j, i.e., X ij = P !2 p j (!) q ij (!). The cancellation of the …rst and second terms on the second line of the above derivation signi…es that the e¤ects of changes in relative prices o¤set each other from the global welfare point of view. It is the result of the fact that the quantity of ! shipped out of i to j has to be equal to the quantity of ! shipped into j from i plus the wastage due to shipping. 9 The last equality of the above derivation is equivalent to
where
Y w is the expenditure share of country i in the world and
Note that the RHS of (7) is equal to the total saving in trade costs, controlling for the volumes of exports, divided by global GDP. 10 This is the direct e¤ect, and, interestingly, the only e¤ect.
The indirect e¤ects, such as those due to the changes in relative prices between countries and in trade balances of di¤erent countries, o¤set each other from the global welfare point of view. The key to obtaining the simple result in (7) is the conservation of physical quantities of goods, trade imbalances summing up to zero, and envelope theorem. One important feature of this model is that it allows for incomplete specialization (for each country and each good, the source of supply can be from all countries simultaneously).
However, there are a number of limitations to the model: 1. there is a …xed number of goods being produced and consumed in the world; 2. the extensive margins of trade are …xed; 3. market structure is perfect competition; 4. although the model can possibly be modi…ed to accommodate monopolistic competition under some special assumptions such as constant markup and homogeneous …rms (e.g. Krugman, 1980) , it is hard to address the case of heterogeneous …rms, such as in Melitz (2003) , even with special assumptions such as constant markup and Pareto distribution of …rm productivity, as the e¤ects of the changes in …rms'entries or exits and …rms'export decisions are hard to account for in this framework. Can we generalize our result to other frameworks?
An alternative to the neo-classical-type model, which is best suited to analyze the situation 9 Controlling for the trade cost of a good, an increase in the F.O.B. price (i.e. pi (!) if country i is the exporter of good !) increases the welfare of the exporter but reduces that of the importer. However, because the F.O.B. value of export of the good by the exporter is equal to the F.O.B. value of import by the importer, the e¤ect on the exporter and that on the importer cancel each other from the global welfare point of view.
1 0 The total exporting costs for exporting from i to j is equal to
. Therefore, the total saving in exporting costs from i to j, controlling for the volumes of exports, is equal to
with incomplete specialization under perfect competition, is the Armington-type models, which feature complete specialization. In the following sections, we shall show that the main result in this section, namely that the indirect e¤ects from di¤erent countries completely o¤set each other, can be applied to the Armington-type models when certain restrictions are imposed. Our interpretation is that when these restrictions are imposed, the imperfect competition models become cousins of the perfect competition model, and so they behave in similar ways.
3 The Armington-type models: the setup and ?? can be regarded as complementary with each other. The fact that the main result in section 2 applies to all these models implies that whether there is complete or incomplete specialization probably does not matter. 11 In this section, we change the setting of the previous section to: 1. existence of a continuum of goods instead of discrete goods; 12 2. CES preferences; 3. if the market structure is perfect competition, then we only need to assume that there is complete specialization; 3. if the market structure is monopolistic competition, then we need to impose some or all of a set of restrictions called A1 and A2 (which implies complete specialization), which will be described in section 4.2 below. Our A1 and A2 are the same as R2 and R3 respectively in ACR. It will be seen that (7) holds in the Armington-type models under these restrictions. The fact that the monopolistic competition models require more restrictions than the perfect competition model re ‡ects the fact that all the monopolistic competition models satisfying A1 and A2 are cousins of the perfect competition model. These assumptions con…ne them to be su¢ ciently close to the perfect competition model so that they are more tractable and "well-behaved". Hence, their user-friendliness stems from their 1 1 In order to make the (endogenous) extensive margins of trade inconsequential, we need to assume CES preferences in the Armington-type models. In the neo-classical type model, on the other hand, we assume general preferences but …xed extensive margins of trade. Therefore, we need either CES preferences or …xed extensive margins of trade in both types of models. 1 2 The case of discrete goods is actually covered though the formal analysis is based on a continuum of goods.
proximity to perfect competition. It is therefore not coincidence that they are widely used. We …rst introduce the basic elements of the Armington-type model, which are by and large adopted from ACR. We …rst consider a world economy consisting of n countries indexed by i = 1; :::; n, with a single factor of input, labor, which is inelastically supplied and immobile across countries.
There is a continuum of goods indexed by ! 2 = [0; N ] that can potentially be made available to consumers. We use L i and w i to denote the total endowment of labor and the wage level in country i respectively.
Tastes, Technology and Market Structure
Preferences: In each country j, the representative consumer chooses her consumption bundle to maximize her utility subject to the budget constraint. Her utility is given by the Dixit-Stiglitz function:
where q ij (!) denotes the consumption of variety ! that is exported from country i to country j; > 1 is the elasticity of substitution. 13 Consequently, we have
where P j is the exact price index in country j and p ij (!) is the price of variety ! that is exported from country i to country j.
Technology: For every good ! 2 , there is a blueprint that can be acquired by one or many …rms depending on the market structure (to be described below). If a …rm from country i produces q fq ij (!)g units of good ! to be sold to country j, its cost function is given by
is an indicator function, w i is the wage in country i, ij w i a i (!) denotes the constant marginal cost inclusive of trade cost, and ij w i denotes the …xed cost of exporting from i to j, where ij 0 8 i; j is exogenous. Note that we treat a country-i …rm serving market i as exporting from i to i. We assume that ii can be non-zero. The exogenously given iceberg trade cost ij 1 8 i; j means that ij units of a good is shipped for one unit to arrive at the destination.
We assume that ii = 0 8 i. The exogenous unit labor requirement parameter a i (!) re ‡ects the heterogeneity of productivities across blueprints. 14 Market Structure: We consider two market structures in each country: (i) perfect competition and (ii) monopolistic competition (with either restricted or free entry). Under both market 1 3 If i = j, then the domestically produced good ! is consumed. 1 4 In fact, equation (7) will continue to be valid even if we adopt more general assumptions on the technology such structures, there is a large number of …rms in each country, and all goods-markets and labor markets clear. Under perfect competition, …rms have free access to all blueprints, and there are no …xed entry costs, production costs or exporting costs.
Under monopolistic competition with restricted entry, we assume that in country i there is an exogenous number of …rms N i < N each freely obtains monopoly power by freely acquiring a blueprint. The assignment of blueprints to …rms is random. Under monopolistic competition with free entry, a …rm from country i needs to hire F i units of labor to develop a blueprint, which confers it with monopoly power. The measure of potential number of goods N i produced in country i is endogenously determined by the zero pro…t condition. In equilibrium, the entry cost, w i F i , is equal to the expected pro…t of each …rm.
Restrictions
Besides the above structure, we also require the model to satisfy some more restrictions.
For monopolistic competition models, we need two macro-level restrictions for each country:
A1 and A2, which will be explained below.
For perfect competition models, we need to have complete specialization. Complete specialization is implied by A2. Besides this, no other restrictions are needed. Therefore the two restrictions are more than su¢ cient for perfect competition models to work.
In the following, we describe these restrictions in detail.
1. Aggregate pro…t is a constant share of total revenue. Let j denote country j's aggregate pro…t gross of entry cost. Total revenue is given by R j = P n i=1 X ji , where X ji denotes the total value of exports from j to i. The …rst macro-level restriction is A1 For any country j, j =R j is constant.
Under monopolistic competition with homogeneous …rms, with and without free entry, and CES preferences, A1 necessarily holds.
2. Import demand is CES. Formally, this macro-level restriction is stated as A2 The import demand system is such that for any importer j and any pair of exporters i 6 = j as cij (wi; tj; !) ij wi aij (!) t 1 1 j fij (wi; tj; !) ij wi bij (!) mij (tj) similar to that of ACR. Please refer to ACR (2012) for detail. We make simpler assumptions here so as to highlight our intuition more clearly.
The elasticity " ik j is the percentage change in the relative imports from country i in country j associated with a small change in the marginal exporting cost from country k to j, holding wages (w i ) and the measure of goods that can be produced (N i ) in each country i …xed. Under perfect competition, A2 implies complete specialization in the sense that for all i and k 6 = i, and for all j, the measure of goods in ij \ kj must be equal to zero, where ij is the set of goods exported from i to j. Complete specialization is a su¢ cient condition under perfect competition for our result to hold. Under monopolistic competition, A2 implies that the measure of …rms that are indi¤erent to selling in a particular market must be equal to zero.
One-sector Armington-type models
The welfare of country j is given by U j = E j =P j , where P j denotes the exact price index faced by the representative consumer in country j. As explained in section 2.1, the percentage change in global welfare is given by
We will show below that (7) continues to hold. In the rest of this section, we only outline the proofs of this result, while relegating the detailed proofs to the appendix.
One-sector model under perfect competition
Under perfect competition, we only need to assume complete specialization, which is implied from A2 (as explained in ACR). In the appendix, we prove the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the market structure is perfect competition. Under complete specialization, the change in global welfare associated with small changes in trade costs is given by equation
Here is a sketch of the proof:
Step 1:
Therefore, the change in real income of country j is given by:
Step 2: Under complete specialization, as each good consumed in a country is solely supplied by a single country (domestic or foreign), the percentage change in its price just depends on that of the unit cost (that of the wage of the producing country) and that of the trade cost. Other than that, the extensive margin e¤ect, called the "specialization e¤ect" in Wilson (1980) , which re ‡ects a change in the pattern of specialization, does not a¤ect the price index. 15 Therefore, the change in the consumer price index is given by:
is country j's share of expenditure on goods originating from country i and consumed in country j.
Step 3: From steps 1 and 2, we have
The term
w i captures the change in purchasing power induced by the general equilibrium adjustments in relative wages, which we refer to as "relative price e¤ect". 16 The term
captures the reduction in expenditure due to trade imbalance, which we refer to as "trade imbalance e¤ect". The term
b ij captures the direct e¤ect of changes in trade costs (saving in trade costs), which we refer to as "direct price e¤ect". Note the similarity between (9) and (6).
Based on (9), we calculate:
where the second line stems from P n j=1 dX net j = 0, which is implied from P n j=1 X net j 0, and from interchanging i and j in the …rst term on RHS of line one. As a result, we have Proposition 1.
From the perspective of global welfare, the relative price e¤ects completely o¤set each other simply because of the conservation of physical quantities of goods -the quantity of ! shipped out of i to j has to be equal to the quantity of ! shipped into j from i plus the wastage due to shipping. The trade imbalance e¤ects completely o¤set each other as P n j=1 X net j = 0. Like in the 1 5 The specialization e¤ect works through a change in the pattern of specialization. This term is attributed to Wilson (1980) . For example, the set of goods produced by Home only (or Foreign only) will change during trade liberalization, leading to welfare e¤ect on each country. (This happens in, say, Dornbusch-Fisher-Samuelson (1977)).
Complete specialization can avoid discontinuity in the e¤ect of specialization on welfare under a small change in trade cost. 1 6 b wj and b wi re ‡ect the changes in F.O.B. prices of goods exported from j and i respectively. Thus, this e¤ect is similar to that explained in section 3.2 underneath (6).
neo-classical-type model presented in section 2, these relationships play a crucial role in obtaining equation (7) .
Examples of models to which this proposition applies are Dornbusch-Fisher-Samuelson (1977), Anderson (1979) and Eaton and Kortum (2002).
One-sector model under monopolistic competition
In the appendix, we prove the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Suppose that the market structure is monopolistic competition. Under assumptions A1 and A2, the change in global welfare associated with small changes in trade costs is given by equation (7).
The following is an outline of the proof.
Step 1: As in the last subsection, the change in real income in country j is given by b
Step 2: Totally di¤erentiating the price index equation given in subsection 3.1 yields an expression for the change in consumer price index, given by:
where ij is the elasticity of extensive margin with respect to the variable cost, and j = P n i=1 ij ij .
Step 3: A2 implies that ij = 1 " (which is a constant) for all i, which, together with steps 1 and 2, implies that the percentage change in welfare of country j is given by: 17
where " < 0 is the elasticity of trade as de…ned in A2; it is assumed that j"j 1 > 0.
The …rst term now captures the relative price e¤ect, the trade imbalance e¤ect and the extensive margin e¤ect (explained below). When …rms are homogeneous, " = 1 . The di¤erence between homogeneous …rms and heterogeneous …rms is that, under heterogeneous …rms, there is one more e¤ect:
. 18 It re ‡ects the e¤ect of the change in the 1 7 The fact that ij is a constant is important in obtaining the …nal result. , yet the e¤ect of the change in the productivity cuto¤ for exporting on welfare, compared with the monopolistic competition models with homogeneous …rms, are very small. This is because the trade elasticity j"j now denotes the shape parameter of Pareto distribution of …rm productivity. According to productivity cuto¤ for exporting on welfare, which we call the "extensive margin e¤ect". This is the outcome of two counteracting forces. A higher productivity cuto¤ for exporting leads to a higher average productivity for exporters and hence a higher welfare for the destination country.
On the other hand, it lowers the probability of exporting and therefore reduces the destination country's welfare. The net e¤ect of these two forces on welfare of the destination j is equal to
Comparing (10) with (9), there is still one more indirect e¤ect, namely that of changes in number of potential entrants, which captures the entry and/or exit of …rms due to changes in trade costs. Hereinafter, we shall refer to this e¤ect as the "potential entrants e¤ect".
Step 4: From A1, we can infer that the number of potential entrants N i in each country i is constant either because it is exogenously determined under restrictive entry or it is unchanged in equilibrium under free entry with a …xed overhead cost in each period. Therefore, in equilibrium, c N i = 0. Hence, the "potential entrants e¤ect"for an individual country is zero, which implies that it does not a¤ect the welfare of an individual country. 19 Step 5: We calculate P n j=1 s j b U j based on (10) . Like in perfect competition in this section and in section 2, the relative price e¤ects of di¤erent countries completely o¤set each other because
w i which is due to conservation of physical quantities of goods.
The trade imbalance e¤ect completely o¤set each other because P n j=1 X net j 0. The extensive margin e¤ects completely o¤set each other due to the CES import demand system, as " is constant.
Combining the results in the …ve steps, we conclude that the change in global welfare is given by (7) . From the global welfare point of view, the relative price e¤ects and the trade imbalance e¤ect completely o¤set each other, as explained in the case of perfect competition. Moreover, the extensive margin e¤ects completely o¤set each other because of the CES import demand system (A2). Therefore, only the direct price e¤ect remains to be relevant for determining the global welfare impact of trade cost reduction. Hence, we have Proposition 2.
Examples of models to which this proposition applies are Krugman (1980) , Melitz (2003) with
Pareto distribution of …rm productivity, and Arkolakis (2010).
The proofs for the one-sector perfect competition model and monopolistic competition model form the basis of the proofs in the extensions discussed in sections 5 and ?? below. Axtell (2001) ,
is close to one. Hence, the e¤ect of the change in the productivity cuto¤ for exporting on welfare, given by
, is close to zero. Consequently, consistent with
Atkeson and Burstein (2010), small changes in trade barriers usually have similar aggregate e¤ects on welfare for each individual country for models with and without …rm heterogeneity. 1 9 However, the potential entrants e¤ect for an individual country will not be zero under the multi-sector extension, as we shall see in section 5.1.
Extensions of the basic Armington-type model
In this section, we consider a number of extensions of the basic Armington-type models in the last section to the cases with multiple sectors and multiple factors, and the existence of tradable intermediate goods. We conclude that Propositions 1 and 2 continue to hold under these settings.
In other words, the structure of the trade model does not a¤ect the property that the change in global welfare only depends on the direct e¤ect of the reduction of trade costs. The proofs in these cases are fundamentally similar to those explained in the last section. Because of the proofs are long, we only outline the intuition below while relegating the detailed proof to the appendix.
Multiple Sectors
The virtue of extending to the multiple sector setting is that we can allow for di¤erent trade costs in di¤erent sectors, which is an important empirical fact. Suppose that the set of goods ! 2 is separated into groups denoted by s where s = 1; :::; S, and s is referred to as sector s. Consumers in country j have their preferences represented by the following utility function: 20
1 denotes the (constant) share of expenditure on goods in sector s in any country, q s ij (!) denotes the consumption of variety ! in sector s in country j of goods originating from country i. Now, we assume that our macro-level restrictions apply to the sectoral level variables, namely, total pro…t of sector s of country j, s j ; total revenue of sector s of country j, R s j ; total value of sector s's goods exported from country i to country j, X s ij . A1 and A2 are now modi…ed to:
AM1: For any country j and any sector s, s j =R s j is constant.
AM2:
The bilateral value of exports from country i to country j in sector s, X s ij , satis…es:
Furthermore, when we refer to restricted entry under monopolistic competition in country j, we assume that there is an exogenous number of …rms, N s j , each of which freely receives monopoly power as a result of freely acquiring ownership of a blueprint in sector s. Under monopolistic 2 0 Assuming CES preferences across sectors instead of Cobb-Douglas preferences does not a¤ect our result stated in Proposition 3 below. competition with free entry, a …rm in any sector in country i needs to employ F i units of labor to develop a blueprint, which gives it monopoly power. Thus, the entry cost is w i F i . 21 We prove the following proposition in the appendix.
Proposition 3
Therefore, if we assume that s ij = ij for any s = 1; :::; S, the change in global welfare again reduces to (7).
Here we outline the intuition of Proposition 3 by comparing the multi-sector models with the one-sector models. Under perfect competition, the proof of Proposition 3 concerning each sector is very similar to that of the proof of Proposition 1, and so will not be elaborated here. Under monopolistic competition, the change of welfare in country j is given by
It is instructive to compare this equation with (10) in the one-sector monopolistic competition model. One important di¤erence between the two equations is that the potential entrants e¤ect on individual country's welfare captured by c N s i here is not zero anymore under free entry with a …xed overhead cost in each period. 22 The mechanism is as follows. An increase in the number of potential entrants in a country increases the consumer welfare in other countries as the variety of goods available for the latter increases. Therefore, a more positive c N s i tends to increase b U j (note that " < 0). We calculate global welfare impact, 
Multiple Factors and Sectors
In the previous sections, the only factor input is labor. Here we consider multiple factor inputs. We assume that the factor endowment in country i is given by L ki ; where k = 1; :::; K denote indexes of factors. Suppose that goods ! 2 are divided into groups denoted by s , where s = 1; :::; S, and s is referred to as sector s. The representative consumer in country j has preferences given by the following utility function: 25 
, where k (s) is the cost share of factor k in sector s so that P K k=1 k (s) = 1 for all s; l k is the input of factor k; A i (!) denotes the …rm's productivity. To be consistent with the one-sector model, the cost function for producing quantities q fq s ij (!)g is given by
is the aggregate factor cost in sector s of country i; and A i (!) 1=a i (!). The environment of the perfect competition model and monopolistic competition model with restricted entry are the same as in subsection 5.1. Under monopolistic competition with free entry, each …rm from country i needs to pay v s i F i to acquire a blueprint. We prove the following proposition in the appendix.
Proposition 4 If (i) there is complete specialization for models under perfect competition, or (ii)
AM1 and AM2 hold for models under monopolistic competition, then the change in global welfare is given by
The analogue of (11) is
Compared with the single-factor model in the last subsection, the relevant factor cost is aggregate factor cost v s i instead of wage w i . Like the relative price e¤ects, these relative aggregate factor cost e¤ects o¤set each other from the global welfare point of view as a result of conservation of physical quantities of goods. Moreover, the potential entrants e¤ects and trade imbalance e¤ects from di¤erent countries o¤set each other. Thus, only the direct e¤ect remains. 
Multi-stage Production
In this extension we allow some goods to be used only as intermediate inputs into the production of other goods. We assume that each country produces a single nontraded …nal good. The …nal good is produced in three sequential stages. The …nal good is assembled from a continuum of stage-2 outputs indexed by ! 2 . The production of stage-2 output of variety ! (which shall be called "stage-2 !") requires the input of stage-1 output for ! (which shall be called "stage-1 !") and labor. The production of stage-1 ! requires only labor. All stage-1 and stage-2 outputs are tradable, and all countries possess the technologies of production for all stages. The market structure for all goods is assumed to be perfect competition. The production function in the …rst stage in country i is given by
where ! 2 where y 1i (!) is the output of stage-1 !, A 1i (!) 1=a 1i (!) is country i's labor productivity associated with the production of stage-1 !, and l 1i (!) is country i's labor input in the production of stage-1 !. Stage-1 ! and labor are combined in a nested Cobb-Douglas production function at the second stage to produce stage-2 !: 
where x 2i (!) is country i's use of stage-2 ! and is the elasticity of substitution between the inputs in this stage. The utility function is given by U j Y j . The consumer price index in country j, which can be derived from the utility function, is therefore given by
where p ij (!) is the price of stage-2 ! exported from i to j.
We prove the following proposition in the appendix.
Proposition 5
When there is multi-stage production under perfect competition with complete specialization, equation (7) holds.
De…ne mij X mij =E j as the expenditure share of country j on imported stage-2 good from country i, whose production uses the stage-1 good imported from country m. It can be shown in the appendix that
Note that
s j mij = s j ij which further implies
. Therefore, as we calculate P n j=1 s j b U j , the term corresponding to the last term in (42),
. Following a similar procedure as for the one-sector perfect competition model in subsection 4.1, we obtain (7). A detailed proof is given in the Appendix.
When there are many stages of production, the e¤ect of a small change in trade cost in each stage will accumulate to a¤ect the consumer price index, and this direct e¤ect in each stage is only related to the trade value and trade cost in that stage. Again, the indirect e¤ects o¤set each other from the global welfare point of view, just like in subsection 4.1. As a result, the change in global welfare resulting from small changes in trade costs is only a¤ected by the cumulative trade value over all stages between each and every pair of trading partners and changes in trade costs between each and every pair of trading partners. It is noteworthy that this result applies to a model with more than three stages, though we only discuss the three-stage example here for simplicity of exposition.
Examples of models to which this result applies is the one-factor version of the models in Yi 
Existence of a non-traded good sector
In this subsection, we assume that there are two sectors: sector H produces a homogeneous good, and it is a non-tradable; sector D produces a set of di¤erentiated products, and they are all tradable. 26 There is perfect competition in sector H, where production is characterized by constant returns to scale. In the tradable-good sector, there are two possible market structures: perfect competition and monopolistic competition (with either restricted or free entry). Under monopolistic competition with restricted entry, we assume that there is an exogenous number of …rms, N i , in the di¤erentiated good sector of country i. Under monopolistic competition with free entry, a …rm from country i needs to hire F i units of labor to develop a blueprint, which confers it with monopoly power, just as in the basic model. The utility function for the representative consumer in country j is given by
where H j is the consumption of homogeneous good in i, 1 b is the constant share of expenditure on tradable goods, q ij (!) is j's consumption of tradable variety ! that is imported from i. Now, X ij denotes the total value of imports from i to j in the tradable-good sector. j and R j still denote country j's aggregate pro…t gross of entry cost and total revenue. We make the following two assumptions:
AH1: For any country j, j =R j is constant.
AH2:
In the tradable-good sector, the import demand system is such that for any importer j and any pair of exporters i 6 = j and k 6 = j, " ik j = @ ln(X ij =X jj ) @ ln kj = " < 0 if i = k and zero otherwise.
Proposition 6 If (i)
there is complete specialization and perfect competition in the tradable-good sector, or (ii) AH1, AH2 and X net j = 0 8 j under monopolistic competition in the tradable-good sector, then equation (7) holds.
The proof of the perfect competition case is straightforward. Under monopolistic competition, it can be shown that
In Krugman's (1980) monopolistic competition model, " = 1 . Thus, equation (7) holds. (7) to hold. The reason is that the extensive margin e¤ect is not zero anymore when some trade balances are nonzero. Note, however, that j"j is the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution of …rm productivity.
According to Axtell (2001) , the distribution of …rm productivity is Pareto with a very fat tail. This observation has been con…rmed by other studies. This corresponds to " 1 being empirically very close to one. Therefore, there is a presumption that the term
w j is empirically close to zero. Hence, we can conclude that balanced trade is theoretically necessary but empirically not important for (7) to hold.
Existence of Intermediate Good
For this case, we return to a one-sector model. We focus on the case of perfect competition. We now assume that a good ! can either be consumed as …nal good or be used as input in the production of a unique intermediate good. The utility in country j continues to be given by (8) . The production function of the unique intermediate good has the same form as (8) . Therefore, the output of , which can be regarded as aggregate factor cost. Based on this setting, we prove the following proposition in the appendix.
Proposition 7
When there are intermediate goods in the production process, then under perfect competition and complete specialization, equation (7) holds.
As discussed in the previous sections, we know that the expenditure on the …nal goods is given
X ij is net exports and Y j = w j L j is GDP of country j (as GDP is equal to total factor income). To take into account the fact that all goods ! 2 can either be consumed as …nal goods or used as input in the production of intermediate good, we can write total expenditure by country j, f E j , as the sum of the expenditures for …nal and intermediate goods. In other words, f E j = E j + (1 ) R j where R j = P n i=1 X ji denotes total output of intermediate and …nal goods. In addition, Y j = R j since the expenditure share on labor in production of intermediate and …nal goods is . 27 Therefore, total expenditure satis…es:
The intuition for Proposition 7 is as follows. Under perfect competition,
where the second line stems from Y j = E j + X net j and b j = b w j + (1 ) b P j ; the third line arises
As a result, the …rst term in the last line of equation (13),
b i , which captures the "relative price e¤ect", re ‡ects the changes in unit costs of the goods produced by country j relative to the changes in the unit costs of the goods produced by country i. It turns out that the expenditure-share-weighted sum of these terms over all countries completely o¤set each other from the global welfare point of view as a result of the conservation of physical quantities of goods. In addition, the second term in the last line of equation (13), 
Summary
Here is a summary of the results.
1. For the neo-classical-type model: Under perfect competition, …xed extensive margins of trade and allowing for incomplete specialization =) all indirect e¤ects completely o¤set each other =) (7) holds.
2. For the Armington-type models: 1. Under perfect competition, CES preferences and complete specialization (which is implied from A2) =) all indirect e¤ects completely o¤set each other =) (7) holds. 2. Under monopolistic competition without the existence of a nontraded good, CES preferences and A1 and A2 =) all indirect e¤ects completely o¤set each other =) (7) holds. 3. Under monopolistic competition with the existence of a non-traded good, CES preferences and A1 and A2 =) (7) holds under balanced trade, which is needed theoretically, but not important empirically.
From the above summary, we can conclude that (7) works for perfect competition models with and without complete specialization. Moreover, under perfect competition, the equation works without the restrictions A1 and A2 that we impose on the imperfect competition models. Under monopolistic competition, we need various degrees of restriction for the equation to work. In fact, perfect competition should be treated as the benchmark, as it is the most natural assumption to make in analyzing the macroeconomy. The reason for analyzing the imperfect competition models is to understand how much deviation from perfect competition we can allow for our equation to work. It turns out that most of the trade models that are widely used in recent years satisfy our restrictions A1 and A2. Perhaps it is not coincident that these imperfect competition models have been widely used, as they are simpler and more user-friendly, which in turn is because they are closer to perfect competition. By imposing restrictions A1 and A2, we con…ne the models to be su¢ ciently close to perfect competition so that they become the cousins of the perfect competition model.
One class of models that this paper does not include is the imperfect competition models with 
Empirical Application
In this section, we apply equation ( the cumulative welfare gains from these …fty numbers. 30 The yearly changes in trade costs were su¢ ciently small for our equation to be valid, as our equation only applies to small percentage changes. 31 , 32 In another empirical application, we consider a counterfactual experiment of a one-percent reduction in all bilateral trade costs in the year 2010. This reduction can be due to technological improvements or other exogenous changes. Based on our theory, we only need to know the share of total trade value in world GDP in order to calculate the impact on global welfare. The data shows that global trade volume was equal to 22:8% of world GDP in the year 2010. It follows from (7) that the elasticity of global welfare with respect to trade cost is equal to 0:228%.
Conclusion
Our theoretical analysis conveys two messages. First, ACR (2012) …nd that the gains from trade for a country based on a broad class of trade models conditional on the import penetration ratio and trade elasticity are the same regardless of the trade model used. The class of models include the Armington model, Eaton and Kortum (2002), Krugman (1980) , Melitz (2003) with Pareto distribution of …rm productivity. However, when one extends these models to multi-sector settings, the result no longer holds. In this paper, we prove that a broad class of models and settings yield the same global gains from reduction of trade costs conditional on the set of trade ‡ows and set of changes in trade costs. The set of trade models and settings to which the equation is applicable is 2 9 These estimates seem to be quite small. However, they are roughly in line with the …nding of, say, Eaton and Kortum (2002). From Table IX there, we can calculate the GDP-share-weighted average of the welfare gains of the nineteen OECD countries from moving from autarky to the trade situation in 1990 to be 1.72%. (1 + t) # 1.
3 1 Any change in trade costs less than 10% can be regarded as small enough for our equation to hold with su¢ cient accuracy. 3 2 If we had a panel data of pairwise shipping time for all trading partners, or a panel of detailed data on freight rates for all importers, we could carry out a more accurate calculation of global welfare gains due to savings in shipping costs or other types of trade costs. Unfortunately, these data are not readily available at present. Therefore, we leave it for future research.
considerably broader than that of ACR. In addition, unlike ACR, whether or not trade is balanced is not important in our paper. Moreover, unlike ACR, our equation does not require estimation of trade elasticity, which is hard to estimate.
The second message is that the global welfare impact of trade cost reduction only depends on two sets of su¢ cient statistics: (i) the ratio of the bilateral trade volume between each and every pair of trading partners and global income; and (ii) the change in exporting cost for each and every pair of trading partners. Under both perfect competition and imperfect competition, the equation is independent of indirect e¤ects such as changes in relative prices of goods because of the conservation of physical quantities of goods. It is independent of trade imbalances because they sum up to zero in the world. Under imperfect competition, it is independent of the adjustments in the numbers of potential entrants because of the proportionality between total pro…t and total revenue in each country (based on our assumption A1); and it is independent of the adjustments of extensive margins of trade because of the CES import demand system (based on our assumption A2). Therefore, in the end only the direct e¤ect remains.
One may argue that the class of models to which our equation applies is not that broad, given the restrictive nature of assumptions A1 and A2. However, if one accepts that the assumption of perfect competition is an important benchmark for analyzing the global macroeconomy, then our equation is not so restrictive. Under perfect competition, the restrictions A1 and A2 that we impose on the imperfect competition models are not necessary. Therefore, our equation is indeed quite general once one accepts perfect competition as an important benchmark for analyzing the global macroeconomy. In fact, one can cite numerous important papers analyzing the macroeconomy that assume perfect competition as the market structure. The imperfect competition models to which our equation applies can in fact be considered cousins of the perfect competition model. One obvious deviation from this class of models is the imperfect competition models with endogenous variable markups. However, there is no presumption that the gains from trade or trade cost reduction is biased one way or the other when variable markups are introduced.
Our framework can also be applied to analyze the worldwide e¤ects of other shocks, such as endowment change or innovation originating from one country. It is noteworthy that an individual country's gains from reduction of trade costs conditional on a set of bilateral trade ‡ows and a set of changes in bilateral trade costs is in general not robust to the trade model used. In other words, while the global size of gains is independent of the indirect e¤ects, the global distribution of gains is not. It would be interesting to calculate the distribution of the global gains from some important episodes of worldwide trade cost reduction (e.g. Uruguay round of GATT) using di¤erent trade models, and compare the results of di¤erent models and estimates based on other methods such as computable general equilibrium model. This is left for future research.
Appendix (Note that some of these appendixes can be put online in the interest of space once the paper is accepted for publication)
A Proof for subsection 2.1
where the last line stems from ignoring O 2
, which is a residual that contains all terms of order higher than the …rst.
The following sections are proofs of the propositions.
For any importing country j, we denote by G j (a 1 ; :::; a n ) the share of goods ! 2 such that a i (!) a i for all i, and by g j (a 1 ; :::; a n ) the corresponding density function.
B Proof of Proposition 1 (One-sector perfect competition)
Similarly to ACR (2012), we de…ne the following variables:
g ij (a i ; c 1j ; :::; c nj ) = :::
:::
where a (a 1 ; :::; a n ) while a i denotes a vector formed by removing the i-th component from vector a. The variable c ij a i captures the unit cost of goods exported from country i to country j, and g ij (a i ; c 1j ; :::; c nj ) is the conditional probability density function that country i is the cheapest source of supply in country j. We prove Proposition 1 in the following steps.
Step 1: The change in the welfare of country j is given by:
Since the total pro…t of …rms j = 0 under perfect
which immediately implies equation (16).
Step 2: The change in the consumer price index is given by:
Proof: By Lemma 1 in ACR, we know that, due to complete specialization, the consumer price index can be written as:
Totally di¤erentiating this expression, we obtain:
where 
The extensive margin elasticities also satisfy ij k ij = kj i kj according to equation (15) , which implies that
Combining the previous two equations, we obtain equation (17) .
Step 3: The change in global welfare is given by (7):
Proof: By equations (16) and (17), the percentage change in the welfare of country j is given by:
where the last equation stems from Y j = P n i=1 X ji . From (20) , we obtain:
where the second line comes from P n j=1 dX net j = 0, which is implied from P n j=1 X net j 0, and from interchanging i and j in the …rst term in line one.
C Proof of Proposition 2 (One-sector monopolistic competition)
We use the following additional notation:
Note that 1=a ij captures the productivity cuto¤ for exporting in Melitz (2003) ; p ij (a) denotes the price of a good exported from country i to country j with unit labor requirement a, and g ij (a)
is the conditional density function of goods in ij with unit labor requirements a. Proposition 2 is proved in the following steps.
Step 1: The change in welfare is given by (16) .
, which immediately implies equation (16) . Under restricted entry in country j, Y j = w j L j + j . By A1, we have
. This again implies equation (16).
where ij is given by equation (27) below, and j = P n i=1 ij ij .
Proof: By Lemma 2 in ACR, we know that, under assumption A2, the consumer price index can be written as:
Totally di¤erentiating this expression, we obtain
with ij being the counterpart of the extensive margin elasticities under perfect competition. By de…nition of a ij , we know that
Combining equations (26) and (28), we get equation (24) .
Step 3: The change in welfare is given by:
Proof: By Lemma 2 in ACR, the total value of exports from country i to country j equals
Totally di¤erentiating this expression yields:
From equation (28), we get
The last two equations imply:
This implies that, for any i; k 6 = j,
Since
@ ln a jj @ ln kj > 0, the above equation together with A2 imply that the …rst line is equal to " and the second line is equal to zero. This further implies that ij = 1 " for all i. Substituting ij = 1 " into equation (24), we have
This, together with b
as explained in Step 1, imply that
where the last equation stems from
Step 4: The change in the number of potential entrants satis…es c N i = 0.
Proof: Under restricted entry in country i, we have c N i = 0. Under free entry, the zero pro…t
which implies b N j = 0 for all j.
Step 5: The change in global welfare is given by (7):
Proof: Equation (29), together with s j = E j Y w and c N i = 0, imply that
where the second line stems from P n j=1 X net j 0 and
D Proof of Proposition 3 (Multi-sector)
We proceed with the proof in two steps. The consumer price index is given by
where P j (s) denotes the aggregate price index for sector s.
Step 1: The change in global welfare is given by:
Proof: Totally di¤erentiating the consumer price index (31), we get
Similar to step 1 of the proofs in Propositions 1 and 2, we have b 
Step 2: The change in global welfare is given by:
Proof: Here, we will show that equation (33) holds under both perfect competition and monopolistic competition.
Under Perfect competition:
Based on the same derivation as in the proof of Proposition 1, equation (17) continues to hold for each of the sectors. In other words, the change in the aggregate price index P j (s) in sector s is given by
is the penetration ratio of country i's exports in sector s of country j. Substituting this expression into equation (32), we obtain
where the second line stems from P n j=1 X net j 0 and P i;j;s
Under Monopolistic competition:
Based on the same derivation as in the proof of Proposition 2, equation (30) continues to hold from the perspective of the sector under assumption AM2. Hence, the aggregate price index in sector s satis…es:
where N s i is the expected mass of potential entrants in sector s in country i. Substituting this expression into (32), we have:
where the second line stems from Y j = P n i=1 P S s=1 X s ji ; the third line follows from
In addition, under monopolistic competition with restricted entry, N s i is exogenous, i.e., c N s i = 0. Under free entry, R s j = s j = N s j w j F j for all s and j, by AM1 and the free entry condition. Therefore, c R s j = c N s j + b w j . Zero net pro…ts implies that total labor income is equal to total income,
Hence, in both the unrestricted entry and restricted entry cases, we have
Combining the above expression with equation (34), we have:
s ij E Proof of Proposition 4 (Multi-factor and multi-sector)
The consumer price index in country j is given by
In the following proof, we proceed in three steps.
Step 1: The change in GDP is given by
Proof: The production function, the exporting cost function, and the entry cost function in each sector are all Cobb-Douglas. As a result, the total expenditure on factor k in sector s is a fraction k (s) of the total expenditure on all factors in sector s. Under perfect competition and monopolistic competition with free entry, the total expenditure on all factors in country j in sector s is the revenue of country j in this sector R s j = P n i=1 X s ji . Hence the total expenditure on factor k in sector s in country j is k (s) P n i=1 X s ji . Therefore, the total expenditure on factor k in country j is P S s=1 k (s) P n i=1 X s ji , which equals w kj L kj by factor market clearing condition. Under monopolistic competition with restricted entry, the total expenditure on all factors in country j is a fraction 1 of the total revenue of country j in this sector, since the pro…ts of …rms are a fraction of the total revenue in this sector by assumption AM1. Hence, the total expenditure on factor k in sector s in country j is (1 ) k (s) P n i=1 X s ji . Therefore, the total expenditure on factor k in country j is (1 )
which equals w kj L kj by the factor market clearing condition.
Under perfect competition and monopolistic competition with free entry, we have Y j = P K k=1 w kj L kj , which implies:
where the last line follows from b
Similarly, under monopolistic competition with restricted entry, we have Y j = 1 1 P K k=1 w kj L kj by assumption AM1. Totally di¤erentiating this equation yields:
Step 2: The change in global welfare is given by (33).
Proof: We will show that this step holds under perfect competition and under monopolistic competition, separately. Totally di¤erentiating (35) yields
Under Perfect Competition:
Based on same derivation as in Proof of Proposition 1, equation (17) continues to hold from the perspective of a single sector by replacing wage with aggregate factor cost. In other words, the change in the aggregate price index P j (s) in sector s is given by:
where s ij = X s ij = s E i . Therefore, the percentage change in global welfare is given by: 
Under Monopolistic Competition:
Based on the similar derivation as the …rst three steps in the Proof of Proposition 2, we obtain the aggregate price index in sector s:
which is analogous to (30), with b
The …rst line follows from equation (37); the second line stems from (39),
; the third line stems from equation (36); the fourth line comes from P n j=1 X net j 0 and P i;j;s
Under monopolistic competition with restricted entry, N s i is exogenous, i.e., c N s i = 0, which, together with (40), implies (33). Under free entry, R s j = s j = N s j v s j F j for any s;j by AM1 and free entry condition. Therefore, c
Combining (40) and (41), we obtain equation (33) under monopolistic competition with free entry.
F Proof of Proposition 5 (Multi-stage Production)
We proceed to prove this proposition in two steps.
Step 1: The change in welfare is given by
where mij X mij E j denotes the expenditure share of country j on imported stage-2 good from country i, whose production use the stage-1 good from country m.
Proof: Based on similar derivation as in the proof of Proposition 1, we can show that equation (17) continues to hold. However, the marginal cost now is related to where the …rst-stage production happens. Totally di¤erentiating the aggregate price index given in section 5.3, we have
where c mij = wm mi a 1m w i a 2i 1 1 ij denotes the competitive price of a good imported into country j from country i after stage-2 production, whose production use the stage-1 good from country m. Under perfect competition, Y j = w j L j and X net j = Y j E j , which imply b
Substituting (43) into this equation, and invoking P n i=1 P n m=1 mij = 1, we get equation (42).
Step 2: The change in global welfare is given by (7).
Proof: X ij ij E j now consists of two parts: (i) imports of stage-1 goods from country i to country j for producing stage-2 good; this value equals P n m=1 X ijm P n m=1 ijm E m since for each dollar of country m's imports of stage-2 goods from country j, there are dollars of imports of stage-1 goods from country i to country j; (ii) imports of stage-2 goods from i to j for producing …nal good; this value is equal to P n m=1 X mij P n m=1 mij E j . Hence, X ij = P n m=1 X mij + P n m=1 X ijm , ij E j = P n m=1 mij E j + P n m=1 ijm E m , s j ij = P n m=1 s j mij + P n m=1 s m ijm 
where the second line comes from P n j=1 X net j 0; the third line arises from switching m to i; i to j, j to m in the second term of line two; the fourth line follows from equation (44); the …fth line is
, and P n i=1 X ij + X net j = P n i=1 X ji ; the last line comes from interchanging i and j in the …rst term of the second last line. Hence, equation (7) holds.
The following appendices are not for publication. They are for the perusal of the referee only.
G Proof of Proposition 6 (Existence of a non-traded-good sector)
The consumer price index is given by P j = w 
Under Perfect Competition:
Based on the same derivation as in the proof of Proposition 1, equation (17) continues to hold in the di¤erentiated-good sector, i.e.,
where ij = X ij E j . Thus, the change in real income is given by:
where the last line stems from equation (45) and P n i=1 ij = 1 b. Hence, the change in global welfare is given by:
where the second line comes from P n j=1 X net j 0 and P n i=1 X ij + X net j = P n i=1 X ji ; the last line comes from interchanging i and j in the …rst term of the second last line. Hence, equation (7) holds under perfect competition.
Under Monopolistic competition:
Like in perfect competition, . Based on the same derivation as in the proof of Proposition 2, equation (30) continues to hold in the di¤erentiated-good sector, i.e.,
Under monopolistic competition with restricted entry, N i is exogenous, which implies that b N i = 0.
Under free entry, j = N j w j F j . By AH1, we have N j w j F j = j = R j = w j L j . This implies that b N i = 0. Equations (46) and (47), together with b N i = 0 and s j = E j Y w , imply that:
where the third line follows from b E j = 
X ij ; the …fth line follows from P n i=1 X ij + X net j = P n i=1 X ji ; the last line follows from interchanging i and j in the …rst term inside the third set of parentheses in the …fth line. When X net j = 0 for all j, equation (7) holds.
From the …fth line, we can see that the total e¤ect is decomposed into the extensive margin e¤ects, the relative wage e¤ects and the direct e¤ects. The sixth line shows that the relative wage e¤ects o¤set each other, but the extensive margin e¤ects do not add up to zero. 33 The intuition is that the e¤ect of X net j on the extensive margin is through the tradable goods sector only, as
X ij . As a result, the extensive margin e¤ect is equal to (1 b) 
H Proof of Proposition 7 (Existence of Intermediate Good)
Based on same derivation as in the proof of Proposition 1, equation (17) continues to hold, i.e., 3 3 The extensive margin e¤ect is given by where
where the second line follows from P n i=1 X ij + X net j = P n i=1 X ji . Equation (50), together with s j = E j Y w , imply that the percentage change in global welfare is given by:
where the second line comes from P n j=1 X net j 0 and
